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I. Introduction
China’s relationship with the United Nations (“U.N.”) can be
best described as one of growing tension and constant
apprehension. 1 This tension stems from China’s divergent attitude
toward human rights, which stands in stark contrast to the United

† J.D. Candidate 2021, University of North Carolina School of Law. Symposium Editor,
North Carolina Journal of International Law
1 See Sonya Sceats & Shaun Breslin, China and the International Human Rights
System, CHATHAM HOUSE 1 (Oct. 2012), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/International%20Law/r1012_sceatsbreslin.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y5YLRP8] (“[T]here is still intense speculation and some concern, within Western states and
elsewhere, about the extent to which China is bringing this economic power to bear in
other areas of the international system and about its plans in this regard.”).
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Nations’ dedication to international human rights. 2 While many of
the United Nations’ more prominent member states maintain a
strong commitment to international human rights, China views
human rights as a subsidiary foreign policy issue. 3 From China’s
perspective, state sovereignty takes precedence over international
human rights. 4 Consequently, the Chinese government maintains a
defensive position in the face of human rights criticism and often
speaks out against any interference with its internal affairs. 5 China
is especially hostile to criticism coming from other states in the U.N.
General Assembly. 6 According to a 2017 Human Rights Watch
report:
China has worked consistently and often aggressively to silence
criticism of its human rights record before U.N. bodies and has
taken actions aimed at weakening some of the central mechanisms
available in those institutions to advance rights. 7

To that end, China has used different U.N. political bodies, like
the Human Rights Council, to pursue its state-sovereignty agenda. 8
This trend has become more pronounced in recent years, 9 indicating
that China’s assertiveness within the Human Rights Council may be
linked to its growing political clout. As China continues to solidify
its position as a global powerhouse, it threatens to substantially
2 See id. at 4 (“China has no objection to the United Nations expressing concern in
a proper way over consistent and large-scale human rights violations in a given country,
but it opposes the interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of
defending human rights.”) (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 1–2.
4 Abbas Faiz, China Is Building a Global Coalition of Human Rights Violators to
Defend Its Record in Xinjiang – What Is Its Endgame?, THE CONVERSATION (July 18,
2019), https://theconversation.com/china-is-building-a-global-coalition-of-human-rightsviolators-to-defend-its-record-in-xinjiang-what-is-its-endgame-120546
[https://perma.cc/7ZPJ-PEVR].
5 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 1.
6 Id. at 37.
7 HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY: CHINA’S
INTERFERENCE IN UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS 1 (2017),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/chinaun0917_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YHL-WVB7].
8 See id. at 9 (“Within the Human Rights Council, China often advances its positions
as part of a group of countries that refer to themselves as the Like-Minded Group. . . .”).
9 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 2 (“In the past year [China] has also emerged
as a leader of a grouping within the Human Rights Council seeking to reassert the power
of the state in the face of the popular uprisings that have swept many Arab countries and
the new threats to social control posed by the internet age.”).
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weaken the international human rights system. 10
China’s recent treatment of the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang
Provence epitomizes the tension between the United Nations’ global
mission to protect human rights and China’s focus on state
sovereignty. 11 The Chinese government obstinately resists U.N.
efforts to hold it accountable for human rights violations in Xinjiang
and uses state sovereignty as an excuse to justify non-compliance
with U.N. investigation requests. 12 By rebuffing international
criticism of its human rights violations in Xinjiang and refusing to
cooperate with the United Nations, China further weakens the
international human rights system by exploiting limitations inherent
in the system. 13 However, the United Nations is not left without
recourse; at its disposal are several enforcement mechanisms that it
can use to strengthen its position as an effective intergovernmental
entity and to compel greater compliance from China.
One of the more powerful enforcement mechanisms in the
United Nations’ repertoire is its ability to monitor and report on
individual states’ compliance through treaty bodies. 14 Treaty bodies
are monitoring entities composed of independent experts tasked
with conducting unbiased periodic reviews of state efforts to
comply with particular treaties. In contrast to U.N. political bodies,
which are composed of representatives acting on behalf of a
particular state's interests, treaty body experts are unbeholden to any
state or its political agenda. The nonpartisan nature of treaty bodies
10 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 1 (“Because of China’s growing
international influence, the stakes of such interventions go beyond how China’s own
human rights record is addressed at the U.N. and pose a longer-term challenge to the
integrity of the system as a whole.”).
11 See Faiz, supra note 4 (“China’s approach has been to engage with the U.N.’s
human rights bodies to impose its own narrative, which misinterprets sovereignty as being
distinct and above human rights . . . In doing so, it ignores repeated emphasis in
international human rights law that human rights depend on one another. The exercise of
one right, such as the right to sovereignty, cannot allow the violation of another, such as
the right not to be tortured.”).
12 Id.
13 See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7 (describing various actions China
has taken to weaken the U.N. system).
14 See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
COMPLIANCE 9–10 (1999) (“The strength of the U.N. human rights regime lies chiefly in
its monitoring powers, with its strongest ‘enforcement’ power being a critical public
resolution or reports. Exposure is the main instrument at the United Nations’ disposal for
the protection of human rights.”).
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means that these bodies cannot be influenced by a state's economic
and military leverage in the same way that U.N. political bodies,
like the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, have
been. This gives treaty bodies an impartiality that is, by design,
impossible to attain in U.N. political arenas. What is more, “the
monitoring processes of the treaty bodies are the principal means
through which states are held accountable at the international level
for compliance with their international human rights treaty
obligations.” 15 It therefore follows that the United Nations could
increase state accountability by bolstering the role of its treaty
bodies. Since treaty bodies take a non-adversarial approach to
monitoring state compliance 16 and are unencumbered by political
pacts, they could potentially prove more effective in handling
resistance from powerhouse nations than U.N. political bodies do.
In light of China’s manipulation of U.N. political mechanisms, the
Uighur crisis in Xinjiang may be better addressed through this nonpartisan approach.
It is imperative that the United Nations intervene in the Chinese
Uighur crisis, not only because it is of the most egregious human
rights violations of the past decade, 17 but also because it underscores
a larger problem with the U.N. system: namely, the United Nations’
struggle to enforce human rights laws, particularly when dealing
with powerful nations such as China. One of the most ubiquitous
critiques of international law is that it is unenforceable and
therefore, pointless. 18 This is particularly troubling in the present

15 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 36. Each treaty has a group of independent
experts that assess compliance with the treaty. This group makes up what is referred to as
a treaty body. See Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. HUM.
RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/
WhatTBDo.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z2UY-MF2Z] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
16 KENT, supra note 14, at 14.
17 See US Bars China Officials over Uighur Crackdown in Xinjiang, AL JAZEERA
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/bars-china-officials-xinjiangcrackdown-191009025000362.html [https://perma.cc/YBV8-L2GT] [hereinafter US Bars
China Officials] (“Pompeo has previously called China’s treatment of Uighurs one of the
‘worst stains on the world’ and likened the camps to actions by Nazi Germany.”).
18 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.
INSIGHTS (Jan. 22, 1996), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcinginternational-law [https://perma.cc/X2EV-QSDC] (“Nearly always, the first question
asked about international law is, how can it be law if it cannot be enforced? To experienced
international lawyers, it is an old and rather tiresome question, not only because it is asked
so often, but also because of the crucial assumption it contains. The assumption, of course,
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context “[b]ecause of China’s growing international influence, the
stakes of such interventions go beyond how China’s own human
rights record is addressed at the United Nations and pose a longerterm challenge to the integrity of the system as a whole.” 19 The
existing literature is as saturated with warnings about China’s
adverse influence on the United Nations as it is with criticisms of
the United Nations itself. 20 However, while it appears that scholars
have reflected on both the Chinese Uighur crisis and the United
Nations’ enforcement issue (often independently of each other),
none have suggested a solution that could resolve both problems.
Using the Chinese Uighur crisis as a case study, this paper
examines the existing human rights machinery and recommends a
solution that may prove effective beyond the problem at hand. More
specifically, it analyzes the potential efficacy of a shift in focus from
the political enforcement mechanisms frequently employed in the
U.N. human rights context to the non-political methods used by
treaty bodies. Non-political enforcement mechanisms are an
undervalued strength of the U.N. enforcement scheme, one which
may confer strategic advantages. This paper ultimately argues that
U.N. treaty bodies may be better poised to manage resistance from
China because of their independent and objective nature.
Part II of this paper presents a detailed account of the Uighur
crisis in Xinjiang, China’s violations of human rights laws, and the
current international response. Part III discusses why China
presents a special case that necessitates a shift from political
enforcement mechanisms to non-political methods and why, in this
case, it may be more effective to support U.N. treaty bodies rather
than continuing to rely on U.N. political bodies. It further addresses
how the role of treaty bodies can be strengthened within the U.N.
system and possible counter-arguments to this proposed solution.

is that international law cannot be enforced.”).
19 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 1.
20 See Faiz, supra note 4 (warning that China’s mobilization of like-minded
governments is a dangerous development for the international human rights system); see
also Kirgis, supra note 18 (explaining there is a general assumption that international law
cannot be enforced). See generally HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7 (arguing China has
deliberately weakened the U.N. system).
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II. Uighur Case Study
A. The Current Situation in Xinjiang
Under the guise of counter-terrorism, the Chinese government
has arbitrarily detained upwards of two million Muslims in China’s
Xinjiang province since April 2017. 21 The majority of detainees
belong to the Uighur ethnic group, a Turkish-speaking community
largely located in Xinjiang 22 that makes up less than one percent of
China’s total population. 23 The Chinese government uses the terms
“reeducation camps” and “vocational training centers” to refer to
the interment-style camps used to detain Uighur Muslims en
masse. 24 Officials claim that the camps exist to prevent the spread
of terrorism and to help Uighur Muslims assimilate to Chinese
culture. 25 However, a closer look into the severe methods employed
at these camps reveals an ethnic cleansing campaign that can only
be likened to the Holocaust. 26
Though the Chinese government has consistently maintained a
21 See Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNS. ON
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang
[https://perma.cc/ZW5C-XVGK] (last updated June 30, 2020).
22 Other detained Muslim ethnic groups include Kazakhs and Uzbeks. Id.
23 Nick Schifrin & Dan Sagalyn, China Calls It Re-education, but Uighur Muslims
Say It’s ‘Unbearable Brutality’, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/china-calls-it-re-education-but-uyghur-muslimssay-its-unbearable-brutality [https://perma.cc/9KUB-9PVN].
24 Maizland, supra note 21; see Omer Kanat, Outrage over China’s Uyghur Crisis Is
Not a Western Conspiracy, GLOBE POST (Aug. 22, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/
2019/08/22/outrage-uyghur-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/VJZ9-BQFQ] (“[T]wo million
subjected to ‘“re-education camps” for political and cultural indoctrination.’ . . . This was
the first time that the mass-internment camps had been raised anywhere in a U.N. forum.”).
25 Maizland, supra note 21 (“Chinese officials maintain that the camps have two
purposes: to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills, and to prevent citizens
from becoming influenced by extremist ideas, to ‘nip terrorist activities in the bud,’
according to a government report.”).
26 See Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow in
China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (July 4, 2020), transcript
available at https://www.npr.org/2020/07/04/887239225/china-suppression-of-uighurminorities-meets-u-n-definition-of-genocide-report-s [https://perma.cc/E2L8-BSR6] (“A
new report in Foreign Policy says that China’s suppression of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other
chiefly Muslim ethnic minorities in northwest China now meets the United Nations
definition of genocide, mass sterilization, forced abortions and mandatory birth control
part of a campaign that has swept up more than 1.5 million people and what researcher
Adrian Zenz calls probably the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since
the Holocaust.”).
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narrative that only mild interventions are used at the camps to
combat “Islamic extremism,” leaked internal government
documents indicate otherwise. 27 According to the New York Times,
“[e]ven as the government presented its efforts in Xinjiang to the
public as benevolent and unexceptional, it discussed and organized
a ruthless and extraordinary campaign in these internal
communications.” 28 Indeed, the Chinese government has engaged
in a targeted campaign to crack down on anti-government and antiChinese sentiments among the Uighur population in Xinjiang. 29
Tensions between Uighurs and the Chinese government can be
traced back to 2009, when a Uighur-led political demonstration in
Xinjiang’s capital turned into a riot that resulted in significant
casualties. 30 What started as a demonstration protesting “stateincentivized Han Chinese migration in the region and widespread
economic and cultural discrimination” 31 against Uighur Muslims in
Xinjiang became the catalyst for what is now one of the most
egregious discriminatory campaigns by a government entity against
an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust. 32
In the decade since the 2009 riot, the Chinese government has
come to associate any expression of Islam in the Xinjiang region
with Islamic extremism and political separatism— 33 two ideologies
that the government fears could pose a significant threaten to the
Chinese Communist Party’s image of strength, control, and
27 See Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose
How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiangdocuments.html [https://perma.cc/LH9X-QWW9] (providing, among other things, “a rare,
unfiltered look at the origins of the crackdown and the beliefs of the man who set it in
motion” in a series of secret speeches).
28 Id.
29 See id. (“Beijing has sought for decades to suppress Uighur resistance to Chinese
rule in Xinjiang. The current crackdown began after a surge of antigovernment and antiChinese violence . . . Since 2017, the authorities in Xinjiang have detained many hundreds
of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslims in internment camps. Inmates
undergo months or years of indoctrination and interrogation aimed at transforming them
into secular and loyal supporters of the party.”).
30 Maizland, supra note 21.
31 Id.
32 Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, supra note 26.
33 See Maizland, supra note 21 (“Chinese officials are concerned that Uighurs hold
extremist and separatist ideas, and they view the camps as a way of eliminating threats to
China’s territorial integrity, government, and population.”).
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domestic stability. 34 The government’s fears are so pronounced that
one simply has to practice Islam to be perceived as a threat of
national importance requiring the most drastic government
“interventions.” 35 The current landscape is such that,
Most people in the camps have never been charged with crimes
and have no legal avenues to challenge their detentions. The
detainees seem to have been targeted for a variety of reasons,
according to media reports, including traveling to or contacting
people from any of the twenty-six countries China considers
sensitive, such as Turkey and Afghanistan; attending services at
mosques; having more than three children; and sending texts
containing Quranic verses. 36

Officials have also criminalized acts of worship, such as
abstaining from alcohol and fasting during Ramadan, banned
certain Muslim baby names, and demolished mosques. 37 The
government has even gone as far as enlisting Chinese Communist
Party members to live with Uighur families inside their homes to
report on extremist behavior. 38 What falls within the ambit of
“extremist behavior” is entirely up to the Chinese government and
can include basic acts of worship like fasting or wearing a veil in
public. 39
For the majority of detainees imprisoned in the camps, the only
crime committed was being born into the wrong household—one
where Islam is practiced instead of any of the other religions that
the Chinese government finds to be more palatable—and the
punishment for such a crime is exacting. 40 Uighur Muslims who
34 See Ramzy & Buckley, supra note 27 (“Mr. Xi warned that the violence was
spilling from Xinjiang into other parts of China and could taint the party’s image of
strength. Unless the threat was extinguished, Mr. Xi told the leadership conference, ‘social
stability will suffer shocks, the general unity of people of every ethnicity will be damaged,
and the broad outlook for reform, development and stability will be affected.’”).
35 See Maizland, supra note 21 (“In March 2017, Xinjiang’s government passed an
anti-extremism law that prohibited people from growing long beards and wearing veils in
public. It also officially recognized the use of training centers to eliminate extremism . . .
Often, their only crime is being Muslim, human rights groups say, adding that many
Uighurs have been labeled as extremists simply for practicing their religion.”).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id. (“In the eyes of Beijing, all Uighurs could potentially be terrorists or
terrorist sympathizers . . . Following the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese government started
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fled the camps reported that detainees were subjected to extremely
harsh and inhumane conditions including: twenty-four-hour
surveillance; torture; sleep deprivation; involuntary abortions and
sexual abuse of women; forced labor; renunciation of Islam, Uighur
culture, and language; separation of children from their parents,
leaving children in the care of state-run orphanages; 41 organ
harvesting; 42 and mass sterilization of women without their
consent. 43
For the eleven million non-detained Uighur Muslims living in
Xinjiang outside of the camps, the circumstances are not much
better. 44 The Chinese government has transformed the entire
Xinjiang province into a surveillance state, 45 using facial
recognition technology and overhead drones to heavily monitor
resident Uighur Muslims. 46 In some Xinjiang cities, the government
has installed QR codes outside Uighur residents’ homes to facilitate
easier access to individuals’ personal information. 47 At the ground
level, local police subject residents to intrusive acts including, but
not limited to, regular scanning of identification cards, cell phone
searches, forced fingerprinting, DNA and blood sample collections,
photographs and voice sample collections, and frequent check-point
inspections. 48
The Chinese government also requires that Uighur Muslims
provide biometric data in a program advertised as “Physicals for
justifying its actions toward Uighurs as part of the Global War on Terrorism. It said it
would combat what it calls “the three evils”—separatism, religious extremism, and
international terrorism—at all costs.”).
41 Maizland, supra note 21.
42 Will Martin, China Is Harvesting Thousands of Human Organs from Its Uighur
Muslim Minority, UN Human-Rights Body Hears, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/china-harvesting-organs-of-uighur-muslims-chinatribunal-tells-un-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/X3EM-RZLC].
43 Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, supra note 26.
44 See Maizland, supra note 21 (“Even before the camps became a major part of the
Chinese government’s anti-extremism campaign, the government was accused of cracking
down on religious freedom and basic human rights in Xinjiang.”).
45 Id.
46 Sigal Samuel, China Claims It’s Released Most Muslims from Internment Camps.
That’s Doubtful., VOX (July 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/7/30/
20747028/china-uighur-muslims-internment-camps-forced-labor [https://perma.cc/8P5L5URC].
47 Id.
48 Id.
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All.” 49 The information gathered is then entered into a robust
database called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform that uses
artificial intelligence to produce lists of “suspicious people.” These
lists then serve as the basis for further subjugation of Muslim
residents. 50 In fact, “[c]lassified Chinese government documents
released by the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) in November 2019 revealed that more than fifteen
thousand Xinjiang residents were placed in detention centers during
a seven-day period in June 2017 after being flagged by the
algorithm.” 51
Despite the existence of incriminating evidence detailing
China’s appalling actions in Xinjiang, the Chinese government has
repeatedly tried to control the narrative by shrouding the entire
ordeal in secrecy. 52 This, in turn, underscores China’s larger aim of
maintaining a positive public image while continuing to engage in
crimes against humanity. 53 Leaked government documents also
reveal the Chinese government’s fear that general public perception
may shift in favor of Uighur liberation. If, for example, Uighur
students returning home from college find their family members
detained, they might use social media platforms to create a narrative
that would be “widespread and difficult to eradicate.” 54 The
Chinese government’s preoccupation with public opinion may be
indicative of a deeper insecurity that mounting domestic pressure
might force the government’s hand into ending their genocidal
crusade against Uighur Muslims. Given the right circumstances,
China’s insecurity could be taken advantage of to “name and
shame” it into human rights compliance.
Maizland, supra note 21.
Id.
51 Id.
52 See Ramzy & Buckley, supra note 27 (“Of the 24 documents, the directive on how
to handle minority students returning home to Xinjiang in the summer of 2017 offers the
most detailed discussion of the indoctrination camps—and the clearest illustration of the
regimented way the party told the public one story while mobilizing around a much harsher
narrative internally.”).
53 See id. (“Beijing has sought for decades to suppress Uighur resistance to Chinese
rule in Xinjiang.”); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 43 (“China regards it as
important to look good.”).
54 Ramzy & Buckley, supra note 27 (“‘Returning students from other parts of China
have widespread social ties across the entire country,’ the directive noted. ‘The moment
they issue incorrect opinions on WeChat, Weibo and other social media platforms, the
impact is widespread and difficult to eradicate.’”).
49
50
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B. The Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang
According to a Foreign Policy report released in the summer of
2020, “China’s suppression of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other chiefly
Muslim ethnic minorities in northwest China now meets the U.N.
definition of genocide.” 55 For the first time, there is evidence that
the Chinese government has engaged in actions that directly violate
one of the five criteria set forth by the United Nations Convention
for the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide from
1948, namely, the suppression of birth. 56 Actions by the Chinese
government also likely amount to human rights violations,
including: 57 discriminating against Uighur Muslims; restraining
their basic freedoms of assembly and religion; disallowing them to
express their language or culture; depriving them of liberty without
due process; forcing them to perform manual labor; constraining
their freedom of movement; and inflicting serious bodily harm.
These rights are also enshrined in five U.N. treaties that China has
signed and ratified, including: 58 the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 59 the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women; 60 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 61 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 62 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 63 By violating human rights
Telephone Interview by Scott Simon with Adrian Zenz, supra note 26.
Id.
57 See generally UN Treaty Bodies and China, HUM. RTS. IN CHINA (2013),
https://www.hrichina.org/en/un-treaty-bodies-and-china [https://perma.cc/N9B3-7277]
(describing the rights protected by each treaty that China has signed and ratified).
58 See id. (listing and describing the six U.N. human rights treaties that China is party
to).
59 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
60 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
61 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force
June 26, 1987).
62 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
63 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
55
56
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expressly protected in the U.N. treaties it has signed and ratified, 64
China continues to demonstrate a blatant disregard for the concept
of human rights.
China is also signatory to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), though it has not yet ratified the
treaty. 65 This, in effect, means that China has not yet enacted
domestic laws implementing the treaty and is therefore not legally
bound by its specific provisions. Regardless of this fact, however,
China’s position as a signatory obligates it to act in good faith and
to avoid circumventing the directives of the ICCPR. 66 The ICCPR
aims to preserve human dignity by protecting civil and political
rights, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. 67 It explicitly
mandates that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities “not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language.” 68 Not only do China’s
actions in Xinjiang run contrary to the purpose of the ICCPR, but
they violate almost all of the rights protected by the treaty. 69
C. The International Response to China’s Actions
The initial global response to reports of human rights abuses in
Xinjiang was one of condemnation and intense criticism. 70 Among
other reactions,
The U.N. human rights chief and other U.N. officials have
64 See generally UN Treaty Bodies and China, supra note 57 (listing and describing
the six U.N. human rights treaties that China is party to).
65 Id.; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
66 See generally UN Treaty Bodies and China, supra note 57.
67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
68 Id.; John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L.
163, 185 (2009).
69 See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 127 Dec.
16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Knox, supra note 68, at 185.
70 Maizland, supra note 21; see also Elizabeth Paton & Austin Ramzy, Coalition
Brings Pressure to End Forced Uighur Labor, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/07/23/fashion/uighur-forced-labor-cotton-fashion.html
[https://perma.cc/B9TV6TYM] (last updated Aug. 10, 2020) (“[M]ore than 190 organizations spanning 36
countries issued a call to action, seeking formal commitments from clothing brands to cut
all ties with suppliers implicated in Uighur forced labor and to end all sourcing from the
Xinjiang region of China in the next twelve months.”).
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demanded access to the camps. The European Union has called
on China to respect religious freedom and change its policies in
Xinjiang. And human rights organizations have urged China to
immediately shut down the camps and answer questions about
disappeared Uighurs. 71

A group of twenty-two U.N. Human Rights Council member
nations signed a letter in July 2019 reprimanding China for its
treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. 72 Within days, however,
the global response shifted in a different direction. 73 China quickly
amassed a “global coalition of human rights violators to defend its
record in Xinjiang.” 74 This coalition of thirty-seven nations signed
a different letter endorsing China’s actions in Xinjiang. 75 Among
those supporting China were nations with similar repressive
regimes, including the Muslim-majority nations of Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan. 76 With the exception of Turkey—whose Foreign
Minister spoke out against the Chinese government’s oppression of
Uighur Muslims—other Muslim nations have been notably silent,
preferring instead to maintain a strong strategic and economic
relationship with China. 77
The support of these thirty-seven nations, coupled with China’s
vast economic power, has allowed China to continue its operations
in Xinjiang unhindered. 78 Despite widespread recognition that
China’s actions in Xinjiang violate numerous human rights laws,
the U.N. Human Rights Council is powerless to enforce
international human rights laws. 79 The Human Rights Council’s
system is political in nature and requires member states’
Maizland, supra note 21.
Faiz, supra note 4.
73 See id. (“A few days later, a second letter emerged.”).
74 Kanat, supra note 24.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Maizland, supra note 21.
78 See Faiz, supra note 4 (“China’s economic might and worldwide influence enable
it to deflect international criticism of its poor human rights record. With a growing army
of like-minded governments behind it, international human rights safeguards have never
been so dangerously exposed.”).
79 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 4 (“Unless the U.N. and concerned
governments can halt such efforts to manipulate or weaken U.N. human rights
mechanisms, the U.N.’s ability to help protect rights around the globe is at risk not only in
Geneva.”).
71
72
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cooperation to implement substantive corrective action or pass
meaningful mandates. 80 China is one of the U.N. Security Council’s
five permanent members 81 and as a permanent member, China
can—and likely will—veto any measure that the Security Council
might propose to address the situation in Xinjiang. 82 Thus, any
measures taken by U.N. political bodies, like the Human Rights
Council or the Security Council, will likely not prove effective in
holding China accountable 83 for what could conceivably become the
most egregious human rights crisis of our lifetime. 84
Outside of the U.N. apparatus, the United States has taken a
surprisingly 85 firm stance against China’s persecution of Uighur
Muslims. In a series of power moves, the United States has
leveraged its position as China’s strongest economic rival to mount
increasing pressure on the Chinese government to curtail its
oppressive regime in Xinjiang. Not only has the United States
restricted visas for Chinese officials and blacklisted companies
directly involved with the Chinese Uighur Crisis, 86 it has also passed
a law that levies heavy sanctions on any individual or company
whose activities contribute to the human rights violations in
Xinjiang. 87 Given the United States’ position as an international
80 See generally Faiz, supra note 4 (explaining the efficacy of the United Nations
and, by extension, human rights laws depend on the cooperation of countries).
81 United Nations Security Council Fast Facts, CNN WORLD (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/united-nations-security-council-fastfacts/index.html [https://perma.cc/CZ37-KWLT] (last updated Apr. 9, 2020).
82 See id. (“A ‘NO’ vote from one of the five permanent members kills the resolution.
There is no such thing as a ‘VETO’ vote in formal U.N. rules, though a ‘NO’ vote from a
permanent member has the effect of vetoing a resolution.”).
83 See Faiz, supra note 4 (“China is recruiting like-minded governments to push its
line on sovereignty . . . The stronger this menacing form of solidarity grows, the less
effective human rights safeguards will be in these countries.”).
84 See US Bars China Officials, supra note 17 (“Pompeo has previously called
China’s treatment of Uighurs one of the “worst stains on the world” and likened the camps
to actions by Nazi Germany.”).
85

In light of allegations by President Trump’s former National Security Advisor
that the President initially supported China’s crackdown on Uighur Muslims, the United
States’ staunch stance against Uighur subjugation is a rather surprising development. For
more information, see Steven Lee Myers, China Lashes Out at U.S.’s Action Against
Mass Incarcerations, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/world/asia/china-trump-pompeo-xinjiang-uighursbolton.html [https://perma.cc/QR5J-UL5N].
86 See id.
87 Maizland, supra note 21; see also Ana Swanson, Nike and Coca-Cola Lobby

2021

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE CHINESE UIGHUR CRISIS

519

powerhouse and the United Nations’ inherent limitations as an
intergovernmental organization, the United States’ actions hold
promise. However, this type of bilateral state intervention “should
be seen as only an indirect or, at the very most, a supplementary
agent of change” because it “lacks international authority and
legitimation.” 88 Additionally, the restrictions implemented by the
United States are vulnerable to verbal counter-attacks from China
that they are unauthorized and illegitimate, as well as potential
retaliatory legislation aimed at economically crippling the United
States. 89
III. Bolstering the Role of U.N. Treaty Bodies
Every major human rights treaty has a corresponding committee
or treaty body tasked with interpreting the treaty and monitoring
states’ compliance. 90 Treaty bodies are staffed with a team of
independent experts that assess states’ reports of their respective
compliance and conduct periodic reviews of each state that has
ratified the treaty. 91 Treaty bodies also oversee country inquiries,
review individual complaints, and issue “general comments”
interpreting various treaty provisions. 92 The reporting system

Against Xinjiang Forced Labor Bill, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/29/
business/economy/nike-coca-cola-xinjiang-forced-labor-bill.html [https://perma.cc/5U8
Z-DZ8V] (last updated Dec. 15, 2020) (“The bill, which would prohibit broad categories
of certain goods made by persecuted Muslim minorities in an effort to crack down on
human rights abuses, has gained bipartisan support, passing the House in September by a
margin of 406 to 3. Congressional aides say it has the backing to pass the Senate, and could
be signed into law by either the Trump administration or the incoming Biden
administration. But the legislation, called the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, has
become the target of multinational companies including Apple whose supply chains touch
the far western Xinjiang region, as well as of business groups including the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce. Lobbyists have fought to water down some of its provisions, arguing that
while they strongly condemn forced labor and current atrocities in Xinjiang, the act’s
ambitious requirements could wreak havoc on supply chains that are deeply embedded in
China.”).
88 KENT, supra note 14, at 12.
89 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 12 (“China’s strongest counter-attacks are,
however, directed at the United States.”); see also Myers, supra note 85 (detailing China’s
counterattack following U.S.-imposed sanctions on Chinese officials involved in Uighur
subjugation).
90 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 7.
91 Id.
92 Monitoring the Core International Human Rights Treaties, supra note 15.
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serves as the treaty bodies’ primary supervisory mechanism, 93 so it
is critical that treaty bodies produce accurate reports untainted by
political influences. Staffing treaty bodies with independent experts
safeguards the process from governmental interference and political
pressure.
For treaty bodies to function as intended, states need to provide
their consent and continued cooperation, which makes treaty bodies
non-adversarial by design. 94 Treaty bodies predominantly exist to
help states meet compliance goals, not to criticize poor
performance. 95 This is exemplified in the treaty bodies’ four central
objectives:
1. To make states accountable for their human rights to the
international community;
2. To encourage them to review measures to bring national law
and policy in line with the conventions;
3. To monitor states’ progress made in the de jure and de facto
implementation of rights; and
4. To facilitate public scrutiny of government policies and [NonGovernmental Organization] participation. 96

A. China, a Special Case Necessitating a Shift from the
Enforcement Mechanisms of U.N. Political Bodies to NonPolitical Methods
China presents a special case “[b]ecause of its ascribed
superpower status, its economic and strategic muscle, and
particularly its position as a Permanent Member of the Security
Council.” 97 The situation is further complicated by China’s
reticence to accept human rights criticism, its distinctive position
that state sovereignty precludes U.N. interference with domestic
affairs, and its willingness to manipulate U.N. political bodies in
furtherance of its state sovereignty agenda. Understanding the
interplay of these complex factors better informs considerations of
a possible solution to the Chinese Uighur crisis and explains why
recent U.N. interventions have been unsuccessful. The solution

93
94
95
96
97

KENT, supra note 14, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 2.
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proposed here is tailored with those facts in mind: namely, that
China’s unique situation necessitates greater reliance on the United
Nations’ non-political methods. Bolstering the role of U.N. treaty
bodies may prove more effective in garnering China’s compliance
with human rights laws than current methods of intervention.
To fully appreciate the potential advantages of the proposed
treaty body approach, one must first understand why recent political
efforts to address the Chinese Uighur crisis have failed. To date,
the overwhelming international response to China’s internment of
Uighur Muslims has been one of criticism and admonishment.
Various nations on the Human Rights Council, as well as U.N.
officials, have openly and publicly condemned China’s actions.
The United States has taken things a step further by actively
imposing restrictions on Chinese companies and government
officials involved in Uighur subjugation. The predominant effect of
these collective efforts is to demand that China stop oppressing
Uighur Muslims “or else.” Typically, a strong no-bull approach
carries weight because it is inherently backed by the political clout
of the state(s) involved. The more powerful the state doing the
condemning, the more likely the accused state will modify its
behavior to better conform with human rights norms for fear of the
consequences they may face otherwise. 98 Though this approach is
generally effective with most offender states, it has not been
particularly fruitful when dealing with China. 99 The political and
adversarial nature of this strategy has thus far led only to China
responding by flexing its muscles. This has been true in the past 100
and it still rings true today. Instead of modifying its treatment of
Uighur Muslims in response to intense international pressure, China
has used its own political influence to reshape the discourse. 101 For
98 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 77–79 (discussing how, as one of the
world’s most powerful nations, China often uses its political power to shape the behavior
of smaller nations that cannot afford to be foreclosed from conducting trade with China).
99 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 11–12 (“Although these and other episodes
of repression have made international headlines, the situation of human rights in China has
remained firmly off the Council’s agenda. Clearly this reflects the new balance of power
within the Human Rights Council, but there is also a sense of defeatism among many
Western diplomats about the utility of using even an unsuccessful China resolution as a
lever.”).
100 See KENT, supra note 14, at 234 (explaining that, in response to intense political
pressure from the United Nations for the Tiananmen Square killings, China’s reaction was
total disownment of U.N. authority).
101 See Faiz, supra note 4 (describing how China secured the support of thirty-seven
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this reason and others discussed below, efforts to hold China
accountable in U.N. political arenas will likely continue to fail and
should be approached with caution.
Foremost among these reasons is that China’s immense political
power and resources make it almost untouchable in U.N. political
arenas like those of the Human Rights Council and General
Assembly. In spite of compelling evidence of grave human rights
violations, China’s human rights record has garnered relatively little
attention from the Human Rights Council. 102 The Council has
avoided addressing certain Chinese human rights abuses, even if
those abuses were the subject of considerable public outcry. 103
Human rights experts at the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
also known as the Chatham House, noted that this pattern:
Reflects the new balance of power within the Human Rights
Council, but there is also a sense of defeatism among many
Western diplomats about the utility of using even an unsuccessful
China resolution as a lever. One senior European diplomat in
Geneva said that these days ‘no one would dare’ table a resolution
on China and another that the Chinese government has ‘managed
to dissuade states from action—now people don’t even raise it.’ 104

As such, China will likely continue to wield its power as a shield
against political pressure from other members of the U.N. Human
Rights Council.
China approaches human rights issues within the General
Assembly in largely the same way that it does those arising in the
U.N. Human Rights Council. 105 That is, it uses General Assembly
committees to advance its own human rights agenda in a similar
fashion. 106 One notable difference, however, is how China reacts to
criticism from the two U.N. political bodies. Though it can be said
that China is always sensitive to criticism of its human rights
activities, it is particularly “sensitive to human rights criticism from
other states in the General Assembly, which probably reflects that
body’s higher institutional standing and broader membership

nations with regard to the Uighur crisis).
102 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 11.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 12.
105 Id. at 37.
106 Id.
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compared with the Human Rights Council.” 107
In general, efforts to strongarm China through political means
should proceed with caution because U.N. political entities are
especially vulnerable to Chinese manipulation. China’s ultimate
objective is to eliminate U.N. interference with its domestic human
rights record. 108 It employs several manipulative tactics to achieve
this goal and engineer desired outcomes within U.N. political
bodies. First, China exercises restraint with respect to the matters it
engages in, while also working tirelessly to undermine U.N.
accountability mechanisms through underhanded means. 109 One of
the ways through which China accomplishes this task is by signing
onto positions proposed by countries of the “Like-Minded Group,”
a self-proclaimed indeterminate group of countries within the
Human Rights Council that regularly support each other’s political
aims and have a shared goal of undermining the human rights
system. 110 In this way, China lets other members of the LikeMinded Group take the assertive leadership position, while it plays
a passive role, 111 which allows it to simultaneously keep a low
profile and maintain a position of power. 112 By strategically
supporting the positions of numerous countries sharing its views,
China evades criticism whilst achieving its own objectives. 113

Id. at 37.
Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 55.
109 Id.
110 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 9 (“Within the Human Rights Council,
China often advances its positions as part of a group of countries that refer to themselves
as the Like-Minded Group (LMG), an amorphous group that has usually included Algeria,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela,
Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. These countries have demonstrated political solidarity in the
Council and have worked together to weaken the universality of human rights standards
and resist the Council’s ability to adopt country-specific approaches.”).
111 Id. (“As one diplomat noted, in the Council, Chinese diplomats “don’t take the
leadership. They have others to play this game. . . . Other actors are in charge of the dirty
work.”).
112 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 55 (“China is remarkably judicious about
the issues on which it engages and has for the most part cultivated a low profile, forgoing
leadership even on its preferred issues including socio-economic rights. This back-seat
role almost certainly reflects China’s success in the late 1990s in deflecting discussions
with Western states about its human rights record into bilateral fora in which it increasingly
holds the upper hand.”).
113 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 9.
107
108
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Another way in which China manages to contemporaneously
keep a low profile and strengthen its power within the United
Nations is by encouraging the use of bilateral human rights
dialogues, or private one-on-one negotiations. 114 The Chinese
government rewards countries that agree to resolve human rights
issues through the use of bilateral dialogues, instead of by engaging
public human rights mechanisms. 115 These dialogues serve as “an
insurance policy of sorts” against Council resolutions on human
rights concerns in China. 116 Little is known about what goes on
during these bilateral dialogues, as they are part of the diplomatic
process and are private by design, but they have been described as
“notoriously problematic.” 117 More specifically, bilateral dialogues
have been repeatedly criticized by several countries and NonGovernmental Organizations (“NGOs”) for being inherently nontransparent and potentially ineffectual, particularly because they
have consistently failed to produce tangible results with respect to
China’s human rights abuses— 118 which is likely why China prefers
them to other U.N. interventions.
Second, China has taken a strategic position as the “champion
of developing countries” in an effort to expand its support base
within the United Nations. 119 In its role as “champion,” China
comes to the defense of certain developing countries—typically
members of the Like-Minded Group—and supports their issues of
interest. 120 It defends even the worst human rights abusers by
arguing against country-specific actions at the Human Rights
Council. 121 China’s stance against country-specific actions is likely
114 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 30 (“China had assiduously avoided any
demonstration of leadership within the Council, maintaining a low-profile during
negotiations and preferring to raise its concerns privately and bilaterally.”).
115 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 80.
116 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 18.
117 Id. at 39.
118 See id. (“Because the dialogues are for the most part a diplomatic process (there
are often other parts of the programme involving academic and other expert participants),
they are non-transparent by nature. This has long been a source of criticism by human
rights NGOs. On a more fundamental level, serious questions have been raised both within
and outside Western governments about whether the dialogues have delivered any tangible
outcomes.”).
119 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 77.
120 Id. See also supra note 110 and accompanying text (listing countries China
supports as part of the Like-Minded Group).
121 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 82 (“China has long argued against country-
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the result of its own fear of being singled out for human rights
abuses. This strategy is also strategically advantageous for China
because it allows the powerhouse nation to garner the support of
developing countries and foster an environment of political
solidarity, all while undermining the Human Rights Council.122
Moreover, China works in tandem with other countries from the
Like-Minded Group to forestall the passage of initiatives aimed at
protecting individual rights, especially those pertaining to political
and civil rights. 123
Third, China often praises “the human rights records of
countries that have been supportive of [it]. At the same time, the
Chinese government, like other major powers at the United Nations,
seeks to exert economic and political pressure on countries to obtain
its goals.” 124 China has been known to threaten punitive actions,
such as implementing a diplomatic freeze or blocking a country
from participating in the Chinese market, to manipulate affairs on
the Human Rights Council. 125 This often leads countries, including
those from the West, to alter their behavior in ways that better
conform to China’s wishes. 126 In addition to wielding its market and
political power, China also uses developmental aid to obfuscate
U.N. resolutions and sway public opinion in its favor. 127 It has
become “a major lender to developing and developed states”
alike, 128 and it does so without any strings attached. 129 While
seemingly altruistic, China’s “no strings attached” approach is
actually cause for concern. Many Western countries use aid
packages to encourage international human rights compliance in
developing countries. 130 Without the economic pressure of aid
specific action at the Human Rights Council, even for the worst abusers of human rights.”).
122 Id. at 77.
123 Id. at 77–78.
124 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 78.
125 Id. at 79.
126 See id. (“China’s threats of punitive action, such as shutting out a country from the
Chinese market or subjecting it to a diplomatic freeze—long a staple of China’s
international interactions in other spheres—result in some delegations on the Council, even
from Western countries, choosing to tone down or dispense with criticism rather than face
China’s ire.”).
127 Id.
128 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 42.
129 See id.
130 Id.
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packages, dictators can thwart demands to improve their human
rights records. 131 China’s no strings attached lending effectually
reinforces the idea that there is no real downside to crimes against
humanity, so long as you have the powerhouse nation as an ally.
Lastly, when faced with criticism, China often attempts to
change the narrative by attacking other countries’ human rights
records. 132 For instance, after the European Union spoke out about
China’s mistreatment of Uighur protesters in July of 2009, China
responded by labeling the protests “violent crimes organized by
separatists” and redirected attention to the European Union’s own
discriminatory practices perpetrated in the fight against terrorism.133
This type of behavior is harmful because “the Human Rights
Council cannot be an effective inter-governmental body if countries
respond to a human rights critique by attacking those raising
concerns for also having human rights problems.” 134
Therefore, attempts to use political power to induce Chinese
cooperation may actually spur an antithetical result. China has
generally maintained a defensive stance within the international
human rights system. 135 Over the last decade, it has not been
receptive to visits by U.N. human rights personnel like the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, preferring to limit its approval to
only those visits that would result in positive reviews. 136 It has been
particularly resistant to U.N. political mechanisms, 137 most likely
131 See id. (“For example, a leaked diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Colombo
in 2007 exposed a concern that Western donors were being displaced by China and other
developing-world donors offering ‘aid without conditions’: ‘As Sri Lanka taps into new
sources of assistance, the Tokyo and other Western donors are at risk of losing leverage
with the Rajapaksa government, making it harder for us and others to prod the government
toward a peaceful solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, and address such concerns on
human rights and corruption.’”).
132 See id. at 18 (“China’s immediate objective is for its delegates to minimize
criticism within the Council . . . the overriding nature of this specific objective is
demonstrated by China’s departure from its opposition in principle to attacks on the human
rights records of other states when it comes to retaliating against those that criticize
China.”).
133 Id. at 12.
134 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 80.
135 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 55.
136 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 61.
137 See id. at 82–87 (explaining how China has resisted certain political mechanisms,
including opposition to country-specific mandates from the Human Rights Council, efforts
to avoid human rights resolutions, and manipulation of the U.N. political processes).
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due to its desire to retain political control in the global arena and
provide social stability domestically. 138
Hence, China has
demonstrated firm hostility to U.N. actions that it perceives as being
more political in nature. 139
Part of the reason for China’s hostility concerns its own past
experiences with the United Nations. 140 Following China’s
crackdown on a Democratic Movement in June 1989, in what is
referred to as the “Tiananmen Square Killings,” U.N. delegates
applied “rigorous, overt, and sustained multilateral and bilateral
pressures.” 141 China was then intensely monitored by the United
Nations 142 and became the focus of strict sanctions from both
financial institutions and other nations. 143 This resulted in China
taking a strong stance against U.N. human rights norms, ultimately
rejecting them entirely. 144 It deflected international criticism by
reasserting its standpoint that state sovereignty precludes U.N.
interference, arguing that its sovereign acts do not require
justification. State sovereignty has always been a staple of China’s
disposition towards the United Nations. 145 However,
From [the Tiananmen Square incident] onwards it became a
central plank of [China’s] general agenda within the U.N. to
promote ultra-statist conceptions of sovereignty and the principle
of non-interference. Thus, China rejected outright the legitimacy
of resolutions on its domestic situation, arguing that they
‘constituted interference in China’s affairs and an attempt to exert
pressure on China’ and were ‘incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 146

The Chinese government cites its experience in the aftermath of

Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 55.
See id. at 19 (“China is particularly hostile to country mandates, which it describes
as ‘the most politicized aspect of the Council.’”).
140 See id. at 3–7 (explaining how China’s engagement within international human
rights system and how it responded to increased pressure from the UN).
141 KENT, supra note 14, at 15.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 233–34.
144 Id. at 234.
145 Id. at 6 (“Chinese commentators agree that the ‘sovereignty-bound’ approach to
international relations and international law is rooted in the period of China’s subjugation
to European powers following the Opium War (1839–42) and the unequal treaties it was
forced to sign, granting concessions and various other privileges to these powers.”).
146 Id.
138
139
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the Tiananmen Square crackdown as coloring its perception of the
international human rights system. 147 Even now, it continues to
affect China’s standpoint on U.N. interference in domestic affairs. 148
Therefore, this paper advocates for a divergence from the methods
historically used to address China’s human rights violations to ones
not marred by decades of tension and power struggles.
B. Greater Emphasis on Non-Political Enforcement
Mechanisms Like Those of U.N. Treaty Bodies
According to Ann Kent, author of China, The United Nations,
and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance, “the strength of the
U.N. human rights regime lies chiefly in its monitoring powers, with
its strongest ‘enforcement’ power being a critical public resolution
or reports. ‘Exposure’ is the main instrument at the United Nations’
disposal for the protection of human rights.” 149 In fact, the primary
tool used to hold states accountable for their compliance with
international human rights laws is the treaty bodies’ monitoring
processes. 150
Treaty bodies may be better equipped to handle resistance than
U.N. political bodies because of their objective nature. That is to
say, treaty bodies are isolated from other political processes within
the United Nations, which enables them to work effectively even in
the face of intense opposition. Although treaty bodies require state
cooperation to carry out certain functions, 151 they can still condemn
a state’s actions irrespective of its acquiescence or position of
power. 152 This allows treaty bodies to be bold in a way that U.N.
political bodies cannot afford to be when bringing attention to an
147 See id. (“Today memories of this era in Geneva are still very strong within Chinese
foreign-policy circles and continue to influence attitudes towards the international human
rights system.”).
148 See id. (explaining how this event relates to China’s current perspective on U.N.
interference).
149 KENT, supra note 14, at 10.
150 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 36.
151 See KENT, supra note 14, at 13–14.
152 See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations
on the Combined Fourteenth to Seventeenth Periodic Reports of China (including Hong
Kong, China and Macao, China), paras. 40–41, U.N. Doc.CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17 (Sept.
19, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17 [https://perma.cc/TKH98Z7C] (acknowledging China’s denials about mistreatment of Uighur Muslims, but still
reporting on the matter and recommending that China make certain policy changes).
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issue. Due to the nature of U.N. political bodies as intergovernmental entities dependent on multi-national cooperation,
these bodies are heavily influenced by political clout. The ability to
bring attention to an issue serves a valuable standard-setting
function, whereby standards are set and countries that do not
comply are “named and shamed” into changing their behavior. The
Chinese government’s avoidance of criticism makes it particularly
sensitive to naming and shaming tactics. 153
Though naming and shaming has not been a viable strategy for
addressing China’s human rights abuses in the U.N. political arenas,
it may be more effective when employed by treaty bodies for the
following reasons. It is no secret that China is heavily invested in
controlling its public image, both globally and domestically. As
discussed above, China typically reacts to public admonishment in
one of the four following ways: (1) deflection (i.e., pointing to the
accusing nation’s own human rights abuses); (2) manipulation (i.e.,
using its political might to influence the actions and opinions of
other countries); (3) changing the narrative to paint itself in a
favorable light (i.e., drumming up support for its actions among the
Like-Minded nations); or (4) claiming state sovereignty (i.e.,
refusing to justify its actions on the grounds that it does not have to
answer to anyone). While China will always be able to claim state
sovereignty regardless of which entity is criticizing it, three of the
four tactics are only useful insofar as other nation are involved and
China is able to wield its political power to influence the outcome.
This means that the majority of China’s go-to tactics are only useful
in U.N. political arenas, making them completely ineffectual when
the source of the criticism is not another nation but is, in fact, a
treaty body. Therefore, placing greater reliance on treaty bodies
may prove fruitful in nudging China towards reforming its actions
in Xinjiang and increasing its compliance with human rights laws.
Moreover, China’s past experiences with treaty bodies indicates
that these bodies may be a better alternative to U.N. political body
enforcement mechanisms. China has routinely demonstrated
hostility to initiatives proposed by U.N. political bodies, but its

153 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 5–6 (“When, in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen Square killings, it became clear that China might be the subject of formal
censure by the Sub-Commission, the government’s opposition to ‘naming and shaming’
approaches crystallized.”).
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resistance to treaty body actions has been less pronounced. 154 That
is not to say that U.N. treaty bodies do not experience difficulties
dealing with China. To the contrary, China has pushed back against
U.N. treaty bodies much like it has other U.N. bodies. However,
China’s reaction to treaty bodies’ inquiries has varied considerably
based on how threatening it perceived an issue to be. 155 In select
cases, “China has been described as taking its reviews before the
committees seriously and engaging earnestly without significant
problems, while in other cases the Chinese delegation’s actions have
been described as marred by bullying, harassment, and
interference.” 156 China’s need to minimize criticism and maximize
positive public opinion appear to be the reasons behind its
antagonistic behavior. 157 China’s preoccupation with public
opinion means that it is naturally less inclined to cooperate with
treaty bodies on some sensitive issues for fear of being perceived
negatively, 158 while also feeling the need to improve public
perception by thoroughly preparing for its reviews and fully
participating in the monitoring process on less sensitive issues. 159
Notwithstanding this level of resistance, U.N. treaty bodies have
continued to uphold their “standards and their rigor.” 160 Overall,
although China has had mixed responses to treaty bodies, its
cooperation in certain situations shows a greater likelihood of
compliance than has been the case with traditional U.N. political
mechanisms which have consistently failed.
154 See id. at 35 (“China’s compliance record with the treaties to which it is party is
generally satisfactory in procedural terms. It submits its periodic reports, though—as is the
case for many other states—they are sometimes very late, and fields large, well-prepared
delegations to participate in examinations.”).
155 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 9 (“[China] appears to allow visits
primarily by independent experts on topics that it sees as nonthreatening.”).
156 Id.
157 See id. at 43 (“Incidents of harassment or manipulation appear driven by China’s
desire to deter criticism. As one U.N. expert observed, ‘First and foremost, I think it’s fair
to say that China regards it as important to look good—to get a good report from a number
of United Nations committees.’”).
158 Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 35.
159 HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 43 (“China is often described as preparing for
and participating in its reviews in a serious, thorough manner.”).
160 KENT, supra note 14, at 250 (“Since 1997, the U.N. Human Rights Commission
and Sub-Commission have become less effective in dealing with China. However, even at
this difficult time, the U.N. treaty bodies, thematic special rapporteurs and working groups,
and specialized agencies have continued to maintain their standards and their rigor.”).
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C. Strengthening the Role of Treaty Bodies Within the United
Nations
There are several ways to strengthen the role of treaty bodies
within the United Nations. Emphasizing the importance of the
treaty bodies’ standard-setting abilities could increase available
funding for treaty body initiatives. Treaty bodies play a critical role
in motivating countries to comply with human rights laws 161 and,
unlike the enforcement mechanisms of political bodies, they are
unbiased and impervious to manipulation. When U.N. political
bodies are at a standstill, treaty bodies can fill the gap by issuing
public condemnation, making them a vital part of the human rights
enforcement machinery. As such, their processes should be
accorded more weight and should not be constrained by limited
funding.
With extra resources, treaty bodies can conduct their work more
effectively, extending their reach to include a wider range of issues.
A raise in funding would mean additional independent experts,
ultimately leading to increased attentiveness to state monitoring,
inquiries, reports, general comments, and reviews of individual
complaints. It would also enable treaty bodies to issue detailed
special reports for egregious human rights violations, bringing
attention to situations that are too grave to overlook. In turn, serious
human rights violations would be given additional exposure—even
if they are not attended to in the United Nations’ political arenas—
which would reinforce the United Nations’ shaming powers.
Special reports also legitimize individual states’ initiatives to
address another state’s misconduct. In cases where a human rights
violators’ political authority commands a larger group of supporters
than those condemning its human rights violations (e.g., China
mobilizing a group of 37 countries to defend its human rights
violations in Xinjiang), a special report would strengthen the impact
of initiatives undertaken by states independently (e.g., the United
States’ restrictions on Chinese officials and blacklist of Chinese
companies).
An inherent limitation of treaty bodies is that they rely heavily
on state cooperation to carry out some of their more important
functions, 162 like state periodic reviews and reviews of individual

161
162

See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 18.
See KENT, supra note 14, at 14 (“[T]reaty and thematic bodies . . . depend to a
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complaints. Minimizing this limitation would go a long way
towards strengthening the role of treaty bodies within the United
Nations. To that end, treaty bodies should conduct periodic reviews
and hear individual complaints independent of a state’s actions.
Even when a state fails to produce a report for its periodic review,
NGOs should still present information on its human rights
conditions and the committee should assess its human rights
compliance. Reviews of individual complaints should be treated
similarly. Not only would this bolster the work that treaty bodies
have already done, but it would give credence to future
recommendations by reinforcing the idea that states cannot avoid
compliance with human rights obligations. Injustices do not stop
existing just because a state evades its duties, and it is important for
the United Nations to underscore that message. 163
D. Potential Counter Arguments
One potential counter argument to this proposed solution is that
treaty bodies cannot actually compel states to fulfill their
international human rights obligations, making them potentially less
effective in garnering state compliance than entities with stronger
enforcement mechanisms like sanctions or embargos. Although
treaty bodies cannot levy strong enforcement mechanisms in the
traditional sense, their standard-setting and shaming abilities are
powerful compliance motivators. Notwithstanding their noncoercive nature, treaty bodies can apply intense pressure on states
to conform with international human rights norms. 164 In China’s
case,
[T]he most significant effect of the U.N. regime has not derived
from its supervision of the implementation of China’s domestic
human rights obligations, since U.N. monitoring on Chinese soil
has required a Chinese consent that, with respect to the case
studies, has been withheld. Rather, it has been located in the
standard setting and promotional aspects of the U.N. regime at the
international level. 165

In addition, China’s aversion to criticism likely means that it

large extent on the continuing cooperation of the state involved.”).
163 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 92–94 (discussing a list of possible
recommendations the United Nations could utilize).
164 KENT, supra note 14, at 10–11.
165 Id. at 247.
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becomes more hostile to stronger displays of public condemnation,
thereby making it less amenable to modifying its behavior. China
has yet to modify its behavior in Xinjiang in response to U.S.
restrictions.
One can also argue that a treaty body’s efficacy is limited by its
reliance on state consent. It is true that states can dampen the impact
of the treaty body system by withholding their approval. 166
However, his paper argues that state non-compliance can be
overcome, in certain cases, if treaty bodies are given the ability to
perform more functions with or without a state’s cooperation. 167 For
instance, treaty bodies should be able to conduct periodic reviews
even if a state decides not to participate in the process. However,
because it is not possible for treaty bodies to accomplish all of their
responsibilities without state approval, this limitation cannot be
dismissed entirely.
IV. Conclusion
The gravity of the Uighur crisis in Xinjiang necessitates U.N.
intervention. However, China’s position as a powerful player in the
United Nations and the global arena generally makes international
intervention a difficult feat. This paper recommends a solution for
the Chinese Uighur crisis that may also prove effective beyond this
specific controversy. China’s propensity to manipulate U.N.
processes using its political power means that the United Nations
must look outside of its political bodies for a resolution. This paper
argues that, by strengthening the role of treaty bodies, the United
Nations may have a better chance of encouraging powerful states
like China to comply with human rights obligations.

166 See Sceats & Breslin, supra note 1, at 36 (“To date, China has refused to allow
application to China of any of the treaty bodies’ stronger enforcement tools. Most
importantly, it has not accepted any of the individual complaints or dispute resolution
mechanisms provided for in the treaties.”); see also HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 7, at 54
(“China often fails to respond to treaty body requests for information and also withholds
relevant information from civil society groups, citing unsubstantiated state secrets
concerns . . . . These objections prevented them from fully assessing Chinese compliance
with the relevant conventions and hindered their ability make a full range of
recommendations.”).
167 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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